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Since the very beginning of the rapidly growing ﬁ  eld of sport economics, the 
relationship between fan attendance and uncertainty of outcome has been playing 
a major role in empirical research. To our best knowledge it was Rottenberg [1956, 
246] who ﬁ  rst stated that “uncertainty of outcome is necessary if the consumer is 
to be willing to pay admission to the game”. Following Fort and Maxcy [2003], this 
statement, also known as the uncertainty of outcome hypothesis, is at the core of one 
of two1 distinct lines in the literature on competitive balance, which aims to derive 
fan demand and its (possible) dependence on uncertainty measures. In contrast to 
this, the second line of literature, the analysis of competitive balance, is primarily 
concerned with descriptive methods.
The success of Rottenberg’s statement is beyond doubt as nowadays the idea of 
competitive balance is omnipresent when it comes to issues of institutional design in 
professional sports leagues. Concepts such as gate revenue sharing, centralized TV 
rights marketing (and subsequent sharing) or salary caps are only but a few battleships 
in the debate on league organization where the “uncertainty of outcome hypothesis” 
serves as a source of legitimacy.
The theory behind the “uncertainty of outcome hypothesis” is rather simple and 
can be stated as a set of three basic assumptions (see Szymanski [2003]): First that 
an unequal distribution of resources for teams leads to unequal competition, second 
that fan interest declines when outcomes become less uncertain and, third that speciﬁ  c 
redistribution mechanisms are suited to produce more outcome uncertainty. We shall 
refer to the ﬁ  rst two assumptions as the core assumptions throughout this paper.
Although the core assumptions seem to make sense at an intuitive level, reality 
places some surprising observations right in front of us. For example fan attendance 
has been growing during the last two decades in most European football2 leagues 380 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
despite of the fact that competitive balance did not signiﬁ  cantly increase.3 Figure 1 
shows the rising number of spectators in the 1. Bundesliga in Germany since the mid-
eighties. At the same time the idealized standard deviation (ISD) reveals the league 
to deviate strongly from its ideal competitive balance level of 1.4
Moreover, important actors of the sports industry exhibit behaviour, which, at ﬁ  rst 
glance, may seem to contradict the core assumptions of competitive balance theory. 
For example, recently in German football, ofﬁ  cials from FC Bayern München have 
been showing a growing resistance against redistribution mechanisms introduced to 
enhance competitive balance in the 1. Bundesliga. Being perhaps the most inﬂ  uen-
tial club in professional German football, Bayern München is stuck in the middle of 
two competitions: On the one hand, the club is a member of the 1. Bundesliga in the 
German Championship and each season faces a schedule of 34 games against other 
league opponents. On the other hand, participation in the UEFA Champions league 
exhibits the club to additional competition on a European scale. In order to compete for 
the UEFA Champions League Championship against clubs as Real Madrid, Juventus 
Turin or FC Chelsea, club ofﬁ  cials argue that they need two things (see the interview 
with Karl-Heinz Rummenigge, CEO of Bayern München, by Hoeltzenbein and Sell-
dorf [2005]): Both a bigger “cake” of TV revenues in German football and second, a 
bigger share of this cake for Bayern München. Obviously, the management of Bayern 
München values the revenues from an improved playing strength in the Champions 
League higher than the potential costs from a loss in fan interest by becoming more 
afﬂ  uent and dominant in German football, otherwise it would prefer to stick to the 
current level of team solidarity.
It is certainly not surprising that critics of Bayern München oppose the plan by pre-
dicting in line with Rottenberg that increased competitive imbalance in the 1. Bundesliga 
will reduce fan interest and ultimately harm Bayern München (see, for example, the 
interview with Harald Strutz, President of FSV Mainz 05, by Zitouni [2005]).
Although we have focused on the German Bundesliga so far, similar observa-
tions hold for other European Football Leagues. For example, in Italy, centralized 
TV rights selling has been abandoned. Thus, each team has the right to sell its TV 
rights separately, which obviously favors the strong teams, such as AC Milan, Inter 
and Juventus.
Both rising fan interest in European Soccer Leagues despite persisting competitive 
imbalance and the push towards lower levels of redistribution would be less puzzling 
if it would turn out that the proposed relationship between competitive balance and 
fan demand is only of minor importance to consumers.
The purpose of this paper is, therefore, to analyze in more detail the relationship 
between competitive balance and fan attendance in European Football. In particular, 
we want to know, how these variables interact with each other: Does competitive 
balance drive attendance or could it be the other way round?5 Therefore, we estimate 
vector autoregressive (VAR) models to avoid an a-priori classiﬁ  cation into endogenous 
and exogenous variables. 
The empirical results are based on seasonal average match attendance data in 
professional German, English, Italian and French football during the seasons 1963/64 
to 2005/06.381 WHO MADE WHO
 FIGURE  1
  Seasonal Development: Average Match Attendance and Competitive 





Using Cain and Haddock [2006]’s version of the idealized standard deviation of 
winning percentages, the CR5 concentration ratio, and the Herﬁ  ndahl-Index, we ﬁ  nd 
signiﬁ  cant differences in the relationship between competitive balance and match 
attendance across countries. Interestingly, the results also differ across different 
divisions within the same country. Our results are especially noteworthy, as they 
represent the ﬁ  rst empirical evidence on the relationship between attendance and 
competitive balance for a variety of international leagues in European Soccer. More 
precisely, no previous study has simultaneously analyzed cross-country data within 
the same discipline. Since the ﬁ  rst paper using time series analysis in sports,6 the 
majority of studies7 have focused on Major League Baseball. Hopefully, the analysis 
presented in this paper will serve as a starting point towards additional research in 
other sports disciplines.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In section “Endogenous Com-
petitive Balance” we argue why fan attendance and competitive balance may each 
be viewed as the endogenous or exogenous variable. This motivates our approach to 
estimate vector autoregressive models. A detailed discussion of our competitive balance 
measures and the corresponding results for Germany is given in section “Empirical 
Analysis”. This section also contains test statistics from Granger causality tests. The 
results for France, England and Italy which can be found in section “Empirical Re-
sults on England, Italy and France” are derived analogously. For the latter two, we 
also analyze the underlying relationship for the Championship and Serie B divisions. 
Our results show a strong heterogeneity in the relationship between fan attendance 
and competitive balance across countries and across tiers within the same country. 
Possible implications of our ﬁ  ndings for governing bodies in European football are 
discussed in the concluding section.
ENDOGENOUS COMPETITIVE BALANCE
Within the theory of competitive balance, it has always been attendance that 
served as the endogenous variable. In contrast to that, measures for competitive 382 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
balance have always been used as exogenous variables in regression speciﬁ  cations. 
However, to a certain extent this distinction seems to be arbitrary, as we need to know 
where competitive balance comes from. In the following, we will show why it might 
indirectly be the distribution of fan attendance that decides about a league’s degree 
of competitive balance.
Based on data from the English Premier League, Hall, Szymanski and Zimbal-
ist [2002] found Granger causality from payrolls to performance. Thus, it seems 
reasonable to expect that differences in payrolls cause differences in performance. It 
is, therefore, important to understand where these differences in payrolls may come 
from. Certainly, a club’s revenues will play a major role for its next season budget.8 
Thus, we have to be aware of the different sources of team revenues in European 
Soccer. Basically, we can distinguish between ticket sales, advertising, merchan-
dise, transfers and TV revenues. In the Bundesliga, over the seasons 2001/2002 to 
2003/2004 the combined share [Straub and Müller, 2005; own calculations] of ticket 
sales, advertising (and merchandise9) were 39.88% (43.22%), 45.71% (49.48%) and 
49.53% (53.51%), respectively.
Here, the combination of advertising and ticket sales is based on evidence by 
Czarnitzki and Stadtmann [2002], who state that fan attendance does not only af-
fect revenues related to admission tickets. Moreover, they ﬁ  nd a positive correlation 
between the willingness of ﬁ  rms to choose a team as an advertising partner and its 
number of spectators in the previous season. Thus, we can state that ticket sales and 
advertising seem to play an important role for a club’s revenues.
Furthermore, it seems straightforward to suspect that a more [less] equal distribu-
tion of clubs’ fan attendances leads to a better [worse] competitive balance. Changes in 
fan attendance are viewed as exogenous shocks in our analysis. These shocks should 
inﬂ  uence competitive balance, because they may lead to the assimilation [dissimilation] 
of ﬁ  nancial resources (budgets) and convergence of marginal productivity of player 
talent. If additional demand for tickets mainly referred to small clubs, the homoge-
neity in the distribution of ﬁ  nancial endowments in the league would be higher. An 
improved (i.e., more equal) distribution of player talent per team10 (as clubs can afford 
to invest similar amounts of money) should be expected in this case.
The marginal productivity argument goes as follows: Competition in professional 
team sports leagues is generally described using a so-called contest success function 
for the clubs (see, for example, El-Hodiri and Quirk [1971]; Dietl, Franck and Roy 
[2003] or the detailed review by Szymanski [2003]).11 In its simplest form, we can 
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where pA
12 denotes the expected percentage of matches won by team A and tA, tB are 
talent investments for each club. In this context, it is usually assumed that clubs 
face identical positive, but decreasing marginal productivity of player talent (see, for 
example, Dietl et al. [2003]), in other words:383 WHO MADE WHO

















Assume now, that there is a strong club, called B, and a weak club, denoted by A, 
competing with each other. The strong club may be expected to have higher invest-
ment costs in player talent. As a result, it faces a smaller marginal impact of investing 
another Euro into player talent than the weak club.
Formally, it can easily be seen that
(3)  ,
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As a consequence, the weak team will always improve more on its contest-success 
function, as long as tA < tB, thereby increasing its expected share of games won.13 In 
other words, regarding its effect on a team’s playing strength, a ten percent increase 
in fan demand is worth more to weak teams than to strong teams. Notice that this 
argument is independent of the distribution of the increase in fan attendance.14
However, one may also imagine a negative inﬂ  uence of changes in fan attendance 
from season t − 2 to season t − 1 on competitive balance changes from season t − 1 to 
season t: Given that our idea stated above is correct, better teams should face a more 
constant demand for tickets. This may enable them to invest into players earlier as a 
potential “critical revenue level” for investments can be reached faster. If these play-
ers picked earlier were players of a higher quality than those who are available at the 
end of the transfer window, competitive balance in the next season might actually be 
worse than in the subsequent season (where the budget will then be assimilated).
Thus, whereas it is plausible that an increase in fan attendance affects competi-
tive balance in a league, its a-priori effect is unclear.
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
MEASURES OF COMPETITIVE BALANCE
Which standards must a league meet in order to be judged as competitively bal-
anced? This is a key question for empirical investigations of competitive balance 
in sports leagues. It requires that measuring uncertainty of outcome15 cannot be 
done without further ado: To derive sensible measures for competitive balance it is 
crucial to ﬁ  rst specify the time horizon on which the degree of competitive balance 
is to be analyzed. Over the years, three different time horizons emerged (see, for 
example, Quirk and Fort [1997]; Czarnitzki and Stadtmann [2002] and Borland and 
Macdonald [2003]): match, season and long-run, where it has to be mentioned that 
different time-horizons may necessitate different measures. Throughout this paper 384 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
we will exclusively focus on the seasonal horizon.16 Within the signiﬁ  cant number of 
measures, two main types can be distinguished, static and dynamic ones. Given that 
most previous studies have been performed with static measures (see, for example, 
Quirk and Fort [1997]; Horowitz [1997], and Michie and Oughton [2004]), we adopt 
this approach in our study.
As we want to make sure that our results are robust and are not due to the choice 
of a speciﬁ  c measure, we work with several measures of competitive balance in the 
empirical analysis.
THE IDEALIZED STANDARD DEVIATION
Measuring seasonal competitive balance by the idealized standard deviation of 
winning percentages has by far been the dominating approach by researchers. Surely, 
one reason for this lies in the measure’s simplicity.
However, Michie and Oughton [2004] point to the drawbacks of measuring com-
petitive balance by the standard deviation of winning percentages in a European 
sports environment. The main problem of applying this measure to European soccer 
lies in the existence of possible draws between contenders. Whereas in American 
sports draws only happen very rarely, it is common for European soccer teams to end 
a season with a signiﬁ  cant number of draws. To circumvent this problem, in a recent 
paper, Cain and Haddock [2006] propose the following procedure:
Rather than viewing each team as having an ex-ante winning probability of 0.5 as 
the ideal situation (as would be the case in a perfectly balanced US sports league), they 
state that soccer matches often end before the better team has the chance to reveal 
itself. In their words [Cain and Haddock, 2006, 331], “0.5 is a conditional probability: 
it is the probability that, were the contest to continue to resolution, the probability of 
each team winning in overtime is 0.5. The Fort-Quirk ISD does not take into account 
the probability that, before the fact, one of the outcomes of the competition is a tie.”
We follow Cain and Haddock [2006] and derive the empirical distribution of wins, 
ties and losses for the German 1. Bundesliga in the period 1963 - 2005. Their relative 
frequencies are given by 37%, 26% and 37%, respectively.
Based on these ﬁ  gures, the expected number of points per match and, subsequently, 
its standard deviation is derived. In a season with N games per team under a 2-point 
regime,17 the standard deviation is given by
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denotes the standard deviation of points won by each team at the end 
of season t.385 WHO MADE WHO
THE CR5 CONCENTRATION RATIO
The CR5 concentration measure of competitive balance allows for a comparison 
between the top 5 clubs in a league and the remaining teams. This index may be inter-
preted as a measure for the degree of dominance by the top 5 teams within season t.
We follow Koning [2000] and Haan, Koning and van Witteloostuijn [2002], who 














where N and W refer to the number of teams within the league in season t and the 
number of points awarded for a win, respectively. Finally, Pit denotes the number of 
points at the end of season t for the team ranked ith.
However, it should be noted that [Koning, 2000, 426] “the concentration ratio is 
not a measure of competitive balance in the whole competition; it applies to the qual-
ity of the top teams”.
THE HERFINDAHL INDEX
For reasons of comparability with previous studies only,18 we also calculate the 
Herﬁ  ndahl-Index at the end of each season. Originally, this index was developed to 
analyze inequalities between all ﬁ  rms in an industry. Using the market share of each 
ﬁ  rm, the index is calculated as follows:







where N denotes the number of ﬁ  rms and sit is the market share of ﬁ  rm i in year t. In 
the context of sports leagues these variables become the number of teams and team 
i’s share of points during season t in the league, respectively.
As can be seen from equation (7), Ht depends on the absolute number of teams. To 
circumvent this problem, we will work with a standardized version of the index, that 
has been proposed by Michie and Oughton [2004], where Ht is multiplied by 100/(1/N); 
a perfectly balanced league would then exhibit a value of 100. 
It is important to understand that for all measures of competitive balance, CB, 
an increase in the value for CBt, refers to a greater imbalance in season t.
THE VECTOR AUTOREGRESSIVE MODEL
Competitive balance theory assumes that competitive balance inﬂ  uences fan at-
tendance. In section “Endogenous Competitive Balance”, we discussed why it might 386 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
be justiﬁ  ed to analyze the relationship of interest without a decision on exogeneity 
and endogeneity. Vector autoregressive (VAR) models provide an empirical framework 
for this type of analysis.19
In order to estimate vector autoregressive models, we have to be assured of the 
series’ stationarity and the non-existence of co-integration.
STATIONARITY AND COINTEGRATION
Figure 2 exposes the logarithmic seasonal development of average match atten-
dance in the 1. Bundesliga since its beginning in the season 1963/64 until 2005/06. 
We also show the seasonal percentage changes.
 FIGURE  2
  Logarithmic Seasonal Development of Fan Attendance in 





The logarithmic transformation is used to decrease the scale in the graph. In Table 
1 the corresponding descriptive statistics are displayed. To provide the reader with 
a more detailed view on the variables used in this study, descriptive statistics for all 
competitive balance measures are included as well. 
 TABLE  1
  Descriptive Statistics: 1. Bundesliga
 Log  (Attendance)  ISD  CR5 Herﬁ  ndahl
Mean 10.133  1.596  0.718  105.756
Median  10.098 1.578 0.723  105.318
Max 10.611  2.128  0.797  109.614
Min 9.769  0.832  0.642  101.423
Std.  Deviation  0.216 0.290 0.037 2.069
From Figure 2 the strong increase in fan attendance since the end of the eighties 
is immediately revealed. Seasonal changes, however, seem to be generated by a sta-
tionary process. In order to verify our impressions, we perform the Augmented-Dickey 
Fuller (ADF) and Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) tests for unit-roots on 
the series. As we use two tests, which differ in the formulation of the null hypothesis 
(ADF: nonstationary; KPSS: stationary), this is also called conﬁ  rmatory data analysis 387 WHO MADE WHO
(see, for example, Maddala [2001, 553]). It should be mentioned however, that this 
procedure may sometimes result in controversial ﬁ  ndings. This can be explained by 
the low power of unit root tests. For this reason, we also give the results from the 
Dickey-Fuller GLS test as the latter possesses a higher power. As shown in Table 2, 
for the original series,20 we can not reject the null hypothesis that there is a unit root 
for Log(Attendance) and the CR5.
 TABLE  2
  Test-Statistics from Unit-Root Tests for the German 1. Bundesliga
 Log  (Attendance)  CR5 ISD
Augmented Dickey Fuller 
Level  (None)  0.745506 -0.084883 -0.037366
Level  (Constant)  -0.174467 -2.524339 -7.675364***
Level (Const. + Trend)  -1.724331  -2.659850  -8.141650***
1st Differences (None)  -2.448335**  -15.96841***  -7.680026***
1st Differences (Const.)  -6.108195***  -15.76622***  -7.576232***
1st Differences (Const. + Trend)  -6.792918***  -15.56543***  -7.507523***
KPSS
Level (Constant)  0.456196*  0.262662  0.346222
Level (Const. + Trend)  0.167171**  0.151672**  0.096460
1st Differences (Const.)  0.307336  0.184789  0.191217
1st Differences (Const. + Trend)  0.052731  0.177093**  0.181566**
Dickey Fuller GLS
Level (Constant)  -0.430460  -2.526918**  -7.659058***
Level (Const. + Trend)  -1.339292  -2.705627  -8.321174***
1st Differences (Const.)  -5.907532***  -14.86588***  -12.58642***
1st Differences (Const. + Trend)  -6.612012***  -15.23881***  -7.127443***
*, ** and *** denote rejection on α = 10%, α = 5% and α = 1% signiﬁ  cance levels, respectively.
The results from Table 2 support our impression from Figure 2: For the seasonal 
changes, i.e., the ﬁ  rst differences in fan attendance, the existence of a unit-root is 
clearly rejected.21 Regarding the competitive balance measures, we state that ISD 
and Herﬁ  ndahl do not show a non-stationary behavior.22 For the CR5, taking ﬁ  rst 
differences is required to obtain a stationary series.
Let us introduce the Δ-Operator to denote First Differences of a series, i.e.
(8)  Δ(Fans)t := Fanst – Fanst-1 
This has important consequences for our interpretation of the estimation results. 
The corresponding VAR speciﬁ  cations can be expressed as
(9) 
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where CBt-i, i=1, …, j denotes the value of the competitive balance measures (in each 
estimation, there is only one measure) for the season [t-i, t-(i-1)]. Both equations are 
estimated simultaneously. The important task is to determine the maximum lag order 
j. This decision can be based on different so-called information criteria. Simply spo-
ken, information criteria are based on the error terms’ variance, i.e. the unexplained 
part of the model. Thus, the lag structure yielding the lowest information criterion 
is the best. Perhaps the best known information criteria are the Akaike information 
criterion (AIC), Hannan-Quinn criterion (HQC) and the Schwarz criterion (SC). In 
this paper, we choose the SC. The reason for this choice is motivated by the fact that 
[Lütkepohl, 2006, 490] “generally, in small samples of ﬁ  xed size T≥16,
(11)  ˆ()ˆ() ˆ() ρρ ρ SC HQC AIC ≤ ≤≤ ≤
where  ˆ() ρ AIC , 
ˆ() ρ HQC  and  ˆ() ρ SC , denote the orders selected by AIC, HQC and 
SC, respectively”. Thus, we want to avoid the situation, in which we include irrelevant 
lags. This is the more likely using the AIC, as the “AIC criterion tends to overestimate 
the order asymptotically and the HQC and SC criteria are both consistent [Lütkepohl, 
2006, 489-90]”.
Although it seems as if we could now proceed with the stationary series and ap-
ply the usual Box-Jenkins analysis, there may be another important effect, which we 
have to account for: co-integration of the series.23
Simply spoken, co-integration describes the fact that for two series that are non-
stationary, there is a linear combination, given by the co-integrating vector, of the 
series which is stationary. The important consequence from co-integration is that 
there exists a long-run relationship between both variables.
Following the two step procedure proposed by Engle and Granger [1987], we 
estimate simple regression models of the form
(12)  Log( ) . Attendance CB tt t = =+ ++ + ββ ε 01
CB = ISD, CR5, Herﬁ  ndahl. We then perform unit root tests on the estimated 
residuals in order to check for the co-integration of Log(Attendance)t and CBt. For all 
measures,24 we are not able to reject the existence of a unit root, i.e. of no co-integra-
tion. Thus, there is no need to rely on error correction models.
ESTIMATION RESULTS FOR THE VAR MODELS
Table 3 contains our estimation results for the German 1. Bundesliga. Based on 
the SC, all measures of competitive balance reveal a VAR(1).25
As can be seen from Table 3, there is a signiﬁ  cant inﬂ  uence from attendance to 
competitive balance for the ISD and Herﬁ  ndahl. Interestingly, the coefﬁ  cients for 
attendance reveal a positive sign. To derive a better understanding of these results, 
we perform Granger Causality Tests on these relationships.389 WHO MADE WHO
 TABLE  3
  VAR results for the German 1. Bundesliga
 Dependent  Variable:  ∆(Fans)    Dependent  Variable:  CB
  Lag (-1)  Lag (-1)  Lag (-1)  Lag (-1)
 indep.  var.  dep.var.  indep.  var.  dep.  Var.
Measure CB  Attendance  Constant  Attendance  CB  Constant
ISD  0.023896 0.042226  -0.029993 0.945425  -0.147601 1.837121
  (0.04608) (0.16776) (0.07487) (0.56565) (0.15537) (0.25245)
  [0.51860] [0.25171]  [-0.40060] [1.67139]  [-0.95000] [7.27730]
∆(CR5)  0.110483 0.028839 0.008245 0.062005  -0.716876  -0.000467
  (0.25179) (0.16352) (0.01299) (0.07205) (0.11095) (0.00572)
  [0.43880] [0.17636] [0.63473] [0.86052]  [-6.46145]  [-0.08150]
Herﬁ  ndahl  0.001974 0.030577  -0.200499 7.481972  -0.001387  105.9237
  (0.00656) (0.16639) (0.69355) (4.08833) (0.16114)  (17.0407)
  [0.30103] [0.18376]  [-0.28909] [1.83008]  [-0.00861] [6.21594]
Standard-errors in () and t-values in []
TESTING FOR GRANGER CAUSALITY
Simply spoken, the concept of Granger Causality says that if x Granger causes y 
it is possible to make better forecasts on y if one takes current and historical values of 
x into account instead of relying purely on values of y. The big advantage of Granger 
Causality tests is the possibility to explicitly address the direction of interaction. In 
Table 4, we give our estimation results on Granger Causality tests based on fan at-
tendance and measures of competitive balance.
 TABLE  4
  Output from VAR Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Tests on 
  Fan Attendance and Competitive Balance Measures (1. Bundesliga)
Null Hypothesis  DF  Chi-Sq  Prob.
∆(Fans) does not Granger Cause ISD 1  2.793538  0.0946*
ISD does not Granger Cause ∆(Fans) 1  2.052272  0.1520
∆(Fans) does not Granger Cause ∆(CR5) 1  0.740499  0.3895
∆(CR5) does not Granger Cause ∆(Fans) 1  0.192542  0.6608
∆(Fans) does not Granger Cause Herﬁ  ndahl 1  3.349201  0.0672*
Herﬁ  ndahl does not Granger Cause ∆(Fans) 1  0.090622  0.7634
*, ** and *** denote signiﬁ  cance on α = 10%, α = 5% and α = 1% signiﬁ  cance levels, respectively
Summarizing, we can say that competitive balance does not seem to play an 
important role for fan attendance on a seasonal level. In other words, connecting our 
ﬁ  ndings to the results by Borland and Macdonald [2003], it seems that the requested 
long-term effect of competitive balance on fan demand can not be veriﬁ  ed on an aver-
age seasonal level. Thus, the data from the 1. Bundesliga do not provide a basis for 
organizational regulations or restrictions aimed at maintaining competitive balance 
in order to secure fan attendance. Interestingly, for the ISD and Herﬁ  ndahl we ﬁ  nd 
evidence for the endogeneity of competitive balance. However, in connection with the 
estimation results from our VAR speciﬁ  cations, we ﬁ  nd surprising evidence that an 390 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
increase in fan demand from season [t−2, t−1) to season [t−1, t) leads to a decrease 
in competitive balance in season t. Although this effect is only weakly signiﬁ  cant 
(α = 10%), it seems as if, for some reason, our marginal productivity argument from 
section “Endogeneous Competitive Balance” does not apply in this situation.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS FOR ENGLAND, ITALY AND FRANCE
In order to obtain a fuller picture of competitive balance and match attendance 
in European Football, we now broaden our analysis to the English Premier League, 
Italian Serie A, and French Ligue 1.26 Besides this cross-country approach, we will 
also analyze the English Championship Division and Italian Serie B to understand 
whether there are signiﬁ  cant differences within a country.
ENGLAND
For the English Football League, we decided to include the two top tiers, the 
Premier League and the Championship Division. We begin with our results from the 
English Premier League.
PREMIER LEAGUE
In Figure 3 we display the development of logarithmic average match attendance 
per season together with the development of the idealized standard deviation. 
 FIGURE  3
  Seasonal Development: Average Match Attendance and 




Figure 3 shows the low level in average match attendance during the 1980s. This 
period was strongly affected by hooliganism in British Football. In comparison to that, 
the ISD measure seems to be stationary. Based on the ADF and KPSS tests,27 we 
ﬁ  nd, similarly to the results for Germany, average match attendance to be difference 
stationary. For the ISD and CR5, the existence of a unit root can be rejected. Finally, 
the Herﬁ  ndahl Index exhibits a trend stationary behaviour.391 WHO MADE WHO
Based on these results, co-integration may only be present for Herﬁ  ndahl. How-
ever, applying the 2-step procedure by Engle and Granger [1987], the existence of 
co-integration could be rejected on a 5% level of signiﬁ  cance.
The VAR results for the English Premier League [see Table 15 in the Appendix] 
reveal a different picture than for Germany. Independent of the underlying competi-
tive balance measure, we do not ﬁ  nd any signiﬁ  cant inﬂ  uence between fan attendance 
and competitive balance.
 TABLE  5
  Output from VAR Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Tests on 
  Fan Attendance and Competitive Balance Measures for the 
  English Premier League
Null Hypothesis  DF  Chi-Sq  Prob.
∆(Fans) does not Granger Cause ISD 1  1.150127  0.2835
ISD does not Granger Cause ∆(Fans) 1  0.002720  0.9584
∆(Fans) does not Granger Cause CR5 1  1.196110  0.2741
CR5 does not Granger Cause ∆(Fans) 1  0.319263  0.5721
∆(Fans) does not Granger Cause Herﬁ  ndahl 1  0.915449  0.3387
Herﬁ  ndahl does not Granger Cause ∆(Fans) 1  0.000811  0.9773
*, ** and *** denote signiﬁ  cance on α = 10%, α = 5% and α = 1% signiﬁ  cance levels, respectively
This effect is also shown in Table 5. To analyze this surprising ﬁ  nding further, we 
now turn to the second highest tier in professional English Football, the Championship 
Division. Similar results for this division might hint at a “country-speciﬁ  c” consumer 
attitude towards competitive balance.
CHAMPIONSHIP
As can be seen from Figure 4, the development within the English Championship 
Division resembles the development for the Premier League.
For the Championship Division, ADF and KPSS reveal average attendance, CR5 
and Herﬁ  ndahl to be difference stationary, too. Again, ISD is found to be stationary.
 FIGURE  4
  Seasonal Development: Average Match Attendance and Competitive  
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Interestingly, we are not able to reject the existence of co-integration between 
attendance and the CR5 on the 5% level of signiﬁ  cance. Thus, we speciﬁ  ed an error 
correction model for the CR5.28 For the Herﬁ  ndahl and ISD, no co-integration was 
detected.
Our estimation results for the Championship Division show a picture more similar 
to the German Bundesliga than to the Premier League. For the Herﬁ  ndahl and ISD, 
we ﬁ  nd a signiﬁ  cant positive29 inﬂ  uence from changes in fan attendance to competi-
tive balance. For the CR5, no signiﬁ  cant relationship was found.
The reader should also note from Table 6 that Granger causality runs in both di-
rections for the ISD. In line with the theory of competitive balance, we ﬁ  nd a negative 
inﬂ  uence from a seasonal increase in competitive imbalance to subsequent average 
match attendance.
 TABLE  6
  Output from VAR/VEC Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Tests 
  on Fan Attendance and Competitive Balance Measures 
  for the English Championship Division
Null Hypothesis  DF  Chi-Sq  Prob.
∆(Fans) does not Granger Cause ISD 1  8.708307  0.0032***
ISD does not Granger Cause ∆(Fans) 1  4.372717  0.0365**
∆(Fans) does not Granger Cause ∆(CR5) 1  1.932003  0.1645
∆(CR5) does not Granger Cause ∆(Fans) 1  0.124305  0.7244
∆(Fans) does not Granger Cause ∆(Herﬁ  ndahl) 1  8.071571  0.0045***
∆(Herﬁ  ndahl) does not Granger Cause ∆(Fans) 1  1.723985  0.1892
*, ** and *** denote signiﬁ  cance on α = 10%, α = 5% and α = 1% signiﬁ  cance levels, respectively
Based on our results for the English Premier League and Championship Division, 
we state that the relationship between competitive balance and fan demand may differ 
across tiers within the same country.
ITALY
We now turn to an investigation of the two top tiers in Italian Soccer, the Serie 
A and Serie B.
SERIE A
In Figure 5 we show the development of logarithmic average match attendance 
and the idealized standard deviation for the Italian Serie A. During the sample period, 
attendance ﬁ  gures generate an inverse U-shape. Based on a graphical inspection, there 
is no obvious relationship between fan demand and competitive balance.
Regarding the stationarity of our variables in the Serie A setting, we obtain ISD 
to be stationary, whereas fan attendance, CR5 and Herﬁ  ndahl-Index are difference 
stationary.
The VAR estimation results30 for the Serie A show no signiﬁ  cant relationship 
between the ISD and attendance. For the Herﬁ  ndahl, we see that an increase in the 
measure will result in an increase in fan attendance.393 WHO MADE WHO
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 TABLE  7
  Output from VAR/VEC Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Tests 
  on Fan Attendance and Competitive Balance Measures 
  for the Italian Serie A
Null Hypothesis  DF  Chi-Sq  Prob.
∆(Fans) does not Granger Cause ISD 1  0.003295  0.9542
ISD does not Granger Cause ∆(Fans) 1  1.746748  0.1863
∆(Fans) does not Granger Cause ∆(CR5) 1  0.609890  0.4348
∆(CR5) does not Granger Cause ∆(Fans) 1  1.110658  0.2919
∆(Fans) does not Granger Cause ∆(Herﬁ  ndahl) 1  1.359483  0.2436
∆(Herﬁ  ndahl) does not Granger Cause ∆(Fans) 1  3.774522  0.0520*
*, ** and *** denote signiﬁ  cance on α = 10%, α = 5% and α = 1% signiﬁ  cance levels, respectively
For the Italian Serie A our results on Granger Causality, displayed in Table 7, 
support our ﬁ  ndings from Table 17. Only for the Herﬁ  ndahl-Index, we ﬁ  nd a signiﬁ  -
cant inﬂ  uence from competitive balance to attendance.
SERIE B
Figure 6 gives the graphical illustration of the development for attendance and 
competitive balance in the Italian Serie B.
Again, the ADF and KPSS test statistics indicate fan attendance to be difference 
stationary. For CR5 and ISD, stationarity can not be rejected. Last but not least, the 
Herﬁ  ndahl-Index is derived to follow a trend stationary process. For the latter, the 
existence of co-integration can not be rejected on the 5% level of signiﬁ  cance.
The results (see Table 18 in the Appendix) do not show any signiﬁ  cant relation-
ship between attendance and competitive balance.
This ﬁ  nding is also reﬂ  ected in the test statistics for Granger causality, displayed 
in Table 8: Independent of the underlying competitive balance measure, we do not 
ﬁ  nd Granger causality in any direction.394 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
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 TABLE  8
 Output from VAR/VEC Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Tests 
  on Fan Attendance and Competitive Balance Measures 
  for the Italian Serie B
Null Hypothesis  DF  Chi-Sq  Prob.
∆(Fans) does not Granger Cause ISD 1  0.794202  0.3728
ISD does not Granger Cause ∆(Fans) 1  0.588456  0.4430
∆(Fans) does not Granger Cause CR5 1  0.408417  0.5228
CR5 does not Granger Cause ∆(Fans) 1  0.310162  0.5776
∆(Fans) does not Granger Cause Herﬁ  ndahl 1  0.660139  0.4165
Herﬁ  ndahl does not Granger Cause ∆(Fans) 1  0.166806  0.6830
*, ** and *** denote signiﬁ  cance on α = 10%,α = 5% and α = 1% signiﬁ  cance levels, respectively
Summarizing our results from Italy, we state that the relationship between com-
petitive balance and fan attendance remains unclear. A possible explanation could 
be the low degree of integrity in these leagues: During our sample period it almost 
regularly happened that points were deducted from teams or that teams were relegated 
due to some kind of misbehavior.31 Thus, fans might be aware of a certain imbalance 
in the league, which can not be captured by our measures.
FRANCE
Figure 7 displays logarithmic average match attendance and the idealized stan-
dard deviation for the French Ligue 1.
As can be seen from Figure 7, average match attendance has signiﬁ  cantly increased 
over the sample period. In contrast to that, the idealized standard deviation shows 
a stationary behavior.
Applying the ADF and KPSS tests, we ﬁ  nd attendance to be difference stationary. 
All competitive balance measures, in turn, are found to be stationary. Therefore, the 
possible existence of co-integration is of no concern to us in the setting of the Ligue 1.395 WHO MADE WHO
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 TABLE  9
  Output from VAR Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Tests 
  on Fan Attendance and Competitive Balance Measures 
  for the French Ligue 1
Null Hypothesis  DF  Chi-Sq  Prob.
∆(Fans) does not Granger Cause ISD 1  4.562709  0.0327**
ISD does not Granger Cause ∆(Fans) 1  4.474809  0.0344**
∆(Fans) does not Granger Cause CR5 1  3.618358  0.0571*
CR5 does not Granger Cause ∆(Fans) 1  0.874708  0.3497
∆(Fans) does not Granger Cause Herﬁ  ndahl 1  1.788538  0.1811
Herﬁ  ndahl does not Granger Cause ∆(Fans) 1  6.760333  0.0093***
*, ** and *** denote signiﬁ  cance on α = 10%, α = 5% and α = 1% signiﬁ  cance levels, respectively
Testing for Granger Causality, we come up with ambiguous ﬁ  ndings. As Table 9 
displays, we ﬁ  nd Granger causality from fan attendance to competitive balance for 
the ISD and CR5. For both measures, we ﬁ  nd evidence (see Table 19 in the Appendix) 
for the marginal productivity effect (see section “Endogeneous Competitive Balance”) 
from an increase in fan demand to competitive balance. In contrast to that, we also 
obtain Granger causality from competitive balance to attendance for the ISD and 
Herﬁ  ndahl-Index. Surprisingly, both measures show an increase in fan demand if 
competitive balance previously decreased.
Concluding our empirical analysis, we state that the relationship between fan 
attendance and competitive balance strongly differs across different leagues. As we 
will discuss in the next section, this has implications for the policies of the national 
and international governing bodies of football.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this paper was to analyze the relationship between competitive bal-
ance and fan attendance in professional European Soccer. In particular, we discussed 
why an ex-ante decision on the exogeneity and endogeneity of the variables might 396 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
not be as obvious as the theory of competitive balance assumes. This motivated us 
to apply a VAR estimation methodology, where this ex-ante decision can be omitted. 
Based on the resulting estimation coefﬁ  cients, we then performed tests for Granger 
causality. Our results clearly show a heterogeneous pattern in the relationship be-
tween fan attendance and competitive balance, ﬁ  rst, across countries and, second, 
across tiers within the same country: For the German Bundesliga, our results indicate 
a signiﬁ  cant inﬂ  uence from fan attendance to competitive balance but not vice versa; 
increases in fan attendance lower competitive balance in the subsequent season. 
However, this effect is only signiﬁ  cant on a 10% level of signiﬁ  cance. In comparison 
to that, we do not ﬁ  nd any signiﬁ  cant relationship between competitive balance and 
fan attendance. This is also true for the Italian Serie A. For the French league, we 
ﬁ  nd that changes in fan demand improve competitive balance afterwards and that 
fan attendance reacts to changes in competitive balance. Thus, there are signiﬁ  cant 
differences across countries with respect to the relationship between competitive 
balance and fan attendance.
Regarding our results for the English Championship Division and the Italian 
Serie B, we ﬁ  nd no clear cut pattern: Whereas the results of the Serie B correspond 
to our ﬁ  ndings for the Serie A, i.e. there is no signiﬁ  cant relationship between these 
variables, the second tier in England reveals strong differences in comparison to the 
English Premier League. Here, we also ﬁ  nd evidence for an inﬂ  uence from fan at-
tendance to competitive balance, similar to our results for the German 1. Bundesliga. 
Noteworthy is the fact that this is the only league, where, based on the ISD, we ﬁ  nd 
evidence for the proposed inﬂ  uence from competitive balance to attendance.
Based on our empirical results, it may seem that fans do not always put as much 
emphasis on competitive balance as theory predicts. However, it is important to note 
that our analysis does not automatically proof the uncertainty of outcome hypothesis 
to be wrong: Given the time period of more than forty years for our study, it seems 
reasonable to suspect that several factors affecting demand may have changed, which 
could not been controlled for32 in our study. Still, we regard it noteworthy to state that 
our results hint at the fact that the inﬂ  uence of competitive balance may be dominated 
by other inﬂ  uence factors.
This point might further be strengthened by the existence of certain institutional 
peculiarities associated with European football leagues, which might render competi-
tive balance less important: On purely theoretical grounds European football leagues 
should be able to deal with a greater imbalance of their teams without losing fan 
interest than typical US Major Leagues. Due to the fact of promotion and relegation 
European leagues may capture fan interest by presenting two competitions simultane-
ously. Less endowed teams at the bottom of the league may activate fan interest by 
competing with each other against being relegated. At the same time the top teams 
compete to qualify for promotion to the next higher league or to international club 
competitions like the Champions league or the UEFA Cup. By providing several focal 
points for fan interest, European football leagues are less likely to become boring even 
if competitive imbalance is high. The result, that competitive balance does rarely drive 
fan attendance may, in part, follow from this peculiarity of European leagues.
In spite of these limitations, we believe that there are important lessons to be 
learned from our results for professional European Soccer: Recall that this paper was 397 WHO MADE WHO
motivated by the on-going debate about team-solidarity in Professional European soc-
cer. Our results show that, on a seasonal level, a need for team solidarity (for example, 
increased TV revenue sharing) can not be justiﬁ  ed by resorting to the theory of competi-
tive balance. In other words, our results indicate that critics of FC Bayern München 
or Juventus Turin may be overreacting. We do not ﬁ  nd support that the popularity of 
the sport is at stake if these teams become more dominant in their domestic leagues. 
It seems that there is no need to act for the governing bodies of football. 
In contrast, we believe our ﬁ  ndings of a signiﬁ  cant inﬂ  uence from attendance to 
competitive balance to support previous research on market design issues. In a recent 
paper Buraimo, Forrest and Simmons [2005] show the strong inﬂ  uence from a team’s 
market size to team success. Therefore, based on our results, it seems reasonable to 
expect that a more homogenous distribution of team market sizes might improve a 
league’s degree of competitive balance.
Regarding future research goals, we would like to mention that our study faces 
some statistical limitations. First, using seasonal average match attendance data 
prevents us from taking the advent of club heterogeneity into account. Moreover, we 
have no possibility to adjust for seasonal ticket holders or to distinguish seated from 
standing viewing accommodation33 (as proposed by Dobson and Goddard [1992]). 
Incorporating these aspects in future research, possibly in association with new ana-
lytical tools such as unit root tests with break points (see, for example, Fort and Lee, 
[2006]), seems to be a promising extension of our study.
  APPENDIX
Within the Appendix we give the results from the ADF, KPSS and DF-GLS unit 
root tests for England, Italy and France. In addition, we also show the VAR/VEC 
estimation results for these countries.
 TABLE  10
  Test-Statistics from Unit-Root Tests for the English Premier League
 Log  (Attendance)  CR5 ISD
Augmented Dickey Fuller 
Level (None)  0.568637  0.188695  0.143947
Level (Constant)  -0.620393  -3.408239**  -4.293044***
Level (Const. + Trend)  -0.607350  -3.402507*  -4.518660***
1st Differences (None)  -5.164381***  -9.377577***  -9.042787***
1st Differences (Const.)  -5.128317***  -9.272693***  -8.968361***
1st Differences (Const. + Trend)  -5.227903***  -9.240496***  -6.559261***
KPSS
Level (Constant)  0.177059  0.258201  0.299574
Level (Const. + Trend)  0.178094**  0.175172**  0.123188
1st Differences (Const.)  0.247674  0.164525  0.162644
1st Differences (Const. + Trend)  0.136695*  0.114770  0.148855**
Dickey Fuller GLS
Level (Constant)  -0.699252  -3.458751***  -4.218231***
Level (Const. + Trend)  -0.772363  -3.432846**  -4.565615***
1st Differences (Const.)  -5.166253***  -7.668936***  -8.872436***
1st Differences (Const. + Trend)  -5.282730***  -8.944963***  -9.063925***
*, ** and *** denote signiﬁ  cance on α = 10%, α = 5% and α = 1% signiﬁ  cance levels, respectively398 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
 TABLE  11
  Test-Statistics from Unit-Root Tests for the English 
 Championship  Division
 Log  (Attendance)  CR5  ISD
Augmented Dickey Fuller 
Level (None)  0.072791  -0.322628  0.345831
Level (Constant)  -1.583221  -3.198452**  -3.975165***
Level (Const. + Trend)  -1.330773  -3.599676**  -4.145979**
1st Differences (None)  -6.545462***  -8.790966***  -7.313785***
1st Differences (Const.)  -6.470169***  -8.669400***  -7.249008***
1st Differences (Const. + Trend)  -6.045348***  -8.566316***  -7.168273***
KPSS
Level (Constant)  0.213170  0.500262**  0.194053
Level (Const. + Trend)  0.197999**  0.137247*  0.117118
1st Differences (Const.)  0.378897*  0.397113*  0.237668
1st Differences (Const. + Trend)  0.150859**  0.389394***  0.156278**
Dickey Fuller GLS
Level (Constant)  -1.403400  -2.574900**  -3.872640***
Level (Const. + Trend)  -1.398958  -3.681827**  -4.162556***
1st Differences (Const.)  -5.878282***  -6.107712***  -1.221731
1st Differences (Const. + Trend)  -6.100900***  -7.418655***  -6.480862***
*, ** and *** denote signiﬁ  cance on α = 10%, α = 5% and α = 1% signiﬁ  cance levels, respectively
 TABLE  12
  Test-Statistics from Unit-Root Tests for the Italian Serie A
 Log  (Attendance)  CR5  ISD
Augmented Dickey Fuller 
Level (None)  -0.062930  -0.278467  0.095658 
Level (Constant)  -1.865786  -2.582092  -6.092617***
Level (Const. + Trend)  -1.660773  -2.756882  -6.479658***
1st Differences (None)  -5.959556***  -11.69921***  -12.43022***
1st Differences (Const.)  -5.882693***  -11.54982***  -12.26968***
1st Differences (Const. + Trend)  -6.828967***  -11.49553***  -12.22049***
KPSS
Level (Constant)  0.218376  0.499636**  0.330291
Level (Const. + Trend)  0.218591***  0.059020  0.160488**
1st Differences (Const.)  0.476524**  0.334976  0.404684*
1st Differences (Const. + Trend)  0.182760**  0.184410**  0.500000***
Dickey Fuller GLS
Level (Constant)  -1.249955  -1.789269*  -2.410867**
Level (Const. + Trend)  -1.347619  -2.800305  -3.237825**
1st Differences (Const.)  -5.057299***  -11.70600***  -12.30990***
1st Differences (Const. + Trend)  -6.360664***  -10.62196***  -10.98142***
*, ** and *** denote signiﬁ  cance on α = 10%, α = 5% and α = 1% signiﬁ  cance levels, respectively
 TABLE  13
  Test-Statistics from Unit-Root Tests for the Italian Serie B
 Log  (Attendance)  CR5  ISD
Augmented Dickey Fuller 
Level (None)  -0.214249  -0.647177  0.307889
Level (Constant)  -2.631546*  -4.125552***  -6.473080***
Level (Const. + Trend)  -2.840559  -5.591397***  -6.543284***
1st Differences (None)  -8.768859***  -6.469792***  -6.060574***
1st Differences (Const.)  -8.686281***  -6.439975***  -6.003170***
1st Differences (Const. + Trend)  -8.707028***  -6.402514***  -5.933901***399 WHO MADE WHO
  TABLE 13 (continued)
  Test-Statistics from Unit-Root Tests for the Italian Serie B
 Log  (Attendance)  CR5  ISD
KPSS
Level (Constant)  0.236548  0.666190**  0.193444
Level (Const. + Trend)  0.207199**  0.153295**  0.127353*
1st Differences (Const.)  0.349624*  0.188085  0.367353*
1st Differences (Const. + Trend)  0.210864**  0.187974**  0.276169***
Dickey Fuller GLS
Level (Constant)  -2.433113**  -4.041623***  -5.945532***
Level (Const. + Trend)  -2.756281  -5.661744***  -6.507712***
1st Differences (Const.)  -6.856588***  -6.522659***  -10.32526***
1st Differences (Const. + Trend)  -8.502462***  -10.36777***  -10.39052***
*, ** and *** denote signiﬁ  cance on α = 10%, α = 5% and α = 1% signiﬁ  cance levels, respectively
  TABLE 14
  Test-Statistics from Unit-Root Tests for the French Ligue 1
 Log  (Attendance)  CR5  ISD
Augmented Dickey Fuller 
Level (None)  1.416405  -0.225967  -0.024430
Level (Constant)  -0.021322  -4.152422***  -6.018971***
Level (Const. + Trend)  -2.380571  -4.884150***  -5.930740***
1st Differences (None)  -5.471168***  -9.822652***  -10.56372***
1st Differences (Const.)  -5.710602***  -9.700552***  -10.46300***
1st Differences (Const. + Trend)  -5.715220***  -4.029245**  -10.41184***
KPSS
Level (Constant)  0.696802**  0.420830*  0.142284
Level (Const. + Trend)  0.155844**  0.188688**  0.119543*
1st Differences (Const.)  0.187790  0.191399  0.240812
1st Differences (Const. + Trend)  0.049034  0.096673  0.180752**
Dickey Fuller GLS
Level (Constant)  0.128790  -3.754024***  -2.437095**
Level (Const. + Trend)  -1.962840  -4.497469***  -5.023969***
1st Differences (Const.)  -4.718053***  -9.812787***  -10.43568***
1st Differences (Const. + Trend)  -5.630762***  -9.753633***  -10.32092***
*, ** and *** denote signiﬁ  cance on α = 10%, α = 5% and α = 1% signiﬁ  cance levels, respectively
  TABLE 15
  VAR results for the English Premier League
 Dependent  Variable:  ∆(Fans)    Dependent  Variable:  ∆(CB)
  Lag (-1)  Lag (-1)  Lag (-1)  Lag (-1)
  indep. var.  dep.var.  indep. var.  dep. Var.
Measure  CB  Attendance Constant  Attendance  CB Constant
ISD  0.001991 0.193843 0.0000602  0.737003 0.287775 1.230945
  (0.03818) (0.16031) (0.06587)  (0.68722) (0.16367) (0.28237)
  [0.05216] [1.20919] [0.00913]  [1.07244] [1.75825] [4.35930]
CR5  -0.166570 0.200589 0.120755  0.084519 0.508181 0.345327
  (0.29480) (0.15870) (0.20685)  (0.07728) (0.14355) (0.10073)
  [-0.56503] [1.26394] [0.58377]  [1.09367] [3.54004] [3.42831]
Herﬁ  ndahl  0.000167 0.194521 0.004017  4.283387 0.219723  -0.015838
  (0.00588) (0.15958) (0.00960)  (4.47683) (0.16493) (0.26945)
  [0.02848] [1.21896] [0.41819]  [0.95679] [1.33226]  [-0.05878]
Standard-errors in () and t-values in []400 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
 TABLE  16
  VAR results for the English Championship Division
 Dependent  Variable:  ∆(Fans)    Dependent  Variable:  ∆(CB)
  Lag (-1)  Lag (-1)  Lag (-1)  Lag (-1)
 indep.  var.  dep.var.  indep.  var.  dep.  Var.
Measure  CB  Attendance Constant  Attendance  CB Constant
ISD  -0.170756  -0.034372 0.268431  0.722080 0.440033 0.880760
  (0.08166) (0.15228) (0.12752)  (0.24469) (0.13121) (0.20491)
  [-2.09110]  [-0.22572] [2.10499]  [2.95098] [3.35353] [4.29827]
∆(CR5)  -0.246135 -0.117885  0.003514  0.057521 -0.216696 -0.000125
  (0.69812) (0.18382) (0.01573)  (0.04138) (0.15716) (0.00354)
  [-0.35257] [-0.64130]  [0.22337]  [1.38997] [-1.37879] [-0.03519]
∆(Herﬁ  ndahl)  -0.017988 0.029665 0.004107  5.009752  -0.266932 0.096737
  (0.01370) (0.16298) (0.01604)  (1.76334) (0.14823) (0.17359)
  [-1.31301] [0.18202] [0.25596]  [2.84105]  [-1.80083] [0.55726]
Standard-errors in () and t-values in []
 TABLE  17
  VAR results for the Italian Serie A
 Dependent  Variable:  ∆(Fans)    Dependent  Variable:  ∆(CB)
  Lag (-1)  Lag (-1)  Lag (-1)  Lag (-1)
 indep.  var.  dep.var.  indep.  var.  dep.  Var.
Measure  CB  Attendance Constant  Attendance  CB Constant
ISD  0.083896 0.011882  -0.151431  -0.026449  -0.043659 1.908183
  (0.06348) (0.16542) (0.11601)  (0.46078) (0.17682) (0.32315)
  [1.32165]  [0.07183] [-1.30535]  [-0.05740] [-0.24692]  [5.90518]
∆(CR5)  0.042387 0.046754 0.001655  -0.046527  -0.626604  -0.000774
  (0.40220) (0.16892) (0.01294)  (0.05958) (0.14185) (0.00457)
  [1.05388] [0.27678] [0.12789]  [-0.78095]  [-4.41733]  [-0.16947]
∆(Herﬁ  ndahl)  0.016211 0.131544 0.000778  4.180071  -0.121305 0.148296
  (0.00834) (0.18244) (0.01261)  (3.58506) (0.16397) (0.24786)
  [1.94281] [0.72102] [0.06165]  [1.16597]  [-0.73980] [0.59831]
Standard-errors in () and t-values in []
 TABLE  18
  VAR results for the Italian Serie B
 Dependent  Variable:  ∆(Fans)    Dependent  Variable:  ∆(CB)
  Lag (-1)  Lag (-1)  Lag (-1)  Lag (-1)
 indep.  var.  dep.var.  indep.  var.  dep.  Var.
Measure  CB  Attendance Constant  Attendance  CB Constant
ISD  0.079446 -0.290366 -0.117790  -0.216494 -0.060948  1.454615
  (0.10356) (0.15200) (0.14310)  (0.24293) (0.16552) (0.22871)
  [0.76711] [-1.91031] [-0.82311]  [-0.89118] [-0.36822]  [6.36002]
CR5  0.415472 -0.303492 -0.289171  -0.019292  0.396172  0.405558
  (0.74602) (0.15149) (0.50282)  (0.03019) (0.14866) (0.10020)
  [0.55692] [-2.00341] [-0.57510]  [-0.63908]  [2.66492]  [4.04753]
Herﬁ  ndahl  -0.016171 -0.373418 -0.009323  0.575912 -0.112156  0.086440
  (0.01990) (0.16707) (0.02289)  (1.41010) (0.16799) (0.19323)
  [-0.81249] [-2.23512] [-0.40725]  [0.40842] [-0.66765]  [0.44735]
Standard-errors in () and t-values in []401 WHO MADE WHO
 TABLE  19
  VAR results for the French Ligue 1
 Dependent  Variable:  ∆(Fans)    Dependent  Variable:  ∆(CB)
  Lag (-1)  Lag (-1)  Lag (-1)  Lag (-1)
  indep. var.  dep.var.  indep. var.  dep. Var.
Measure  CB  Attendance Constant  Attendance  CB Constant
ISD  0.118711 0.133182  -0.162405  -0.828164  -0.031656 1.611009
  (0.05612) (0.15007) (0.08714)  (0.38771) (0.14499) (0.22513)
  [2.11537]  [0.88750] [-1.86374]  [-2.13605] [-0.21834]  [7.15581]
CR5  0.367542 0.128205  -0.238371  -0.111728 0.337822 0.466221
  (0.39298) (0.15781) (0.27632)  (0.05874) (0.14627) (0.10285)
  [0.93526] [0.81241]  [-0.86267]  [-1.90220] [2.30958] [4.53322]
Herﬁ  ndahl  0.023448 0.095342  -2.435977  -3.345487 0.078677  96.67701
  (0.00902) (0.14582) (0.94457)  (2.50156) (0.15471)  (16.67701)
  [2.60006] [0.65382]  [-2.57893]  [-1.33736] [0.50856] [5.96636]
Standard-errors in () and t-values in []
  NOTES
  The authors are especially grateful to Alex Philips and Graham Peaker at UEFA for providing at-
tendance data from England, Italy and France. This paper has beneﬁ  ted from helpful discussions 
with Ingmar Nolte, Liam Lenten, Urs Meister, Men-Andri Benz, Martin Grossmann, Tariq Hasan 
and participants at the “International Sports” session at the Eastern Economic Association’s Annual 
Meeting 2006. The authors also would like to thank three anonymous referees for helpful suggestions. 
Anja Schneider provided excellent research assistance.
1.  Actually, there exists another string, which analyzes different institutional arrangements, such as 
gate revenue sharing, free agency and salary caps with respect to their inﬂ  uence on competitive bal-
ance. See, for example, Booth [2004] and Fort [2003].
2.  Throughout this paper, we will use the terms football and soccer equivalently.
3.  It has to be mentioned that Rottenberg did not specify increases in fan attendance to be exclusively 
due to a greater degree of uncertainty of outcome. The displayed increase in fan attendance might 
also be the result of changes in other inﬂ  uence factors. However, the graphical illustration allows for 
the possibility that competitive balance may only be a second order effect for attendance decisions.
4.  This is the ISD version proposed by Cain and Haddock [2006]. The exact derivation of this measure 
is discussed in section “Empirical Analysis”.
5.  The reasoning for this inverse relationship is given in the next section.
6.  See Scully [1995]. Thus, this research ﬁ  eld may still be considered a rather young one.
7.  We are currently aware of only four exceptions, namely Simmons [1996], Davies, Downward and 
Jackson [1995], Dobson and Goddard [1998] and the recent paper by Hoon Lee [2006]. See Fort and 
Lee [2006] for a short review of this literature.
8.  This argument lies at the core of the revenue sharing system in the USA, which was implemented to 
improve competitive balance.
9.  Although it seems intuitive that the more shirts of a team are sold, the more fans attend games in a 
season, we also give the numbers of advertising and ticket sales, only.
10.  Unfortunately, we are unable to empirically investigate the assimilation of playing strength based on 
our data.
11.  For the sake of simplicity, let us assume that there are only two clubs A and B.
12.  pB is given by 1-pA.
13.  It should be mentioned that this reasoning is in line with empirical results by Dobson and Goddard 
[1998, 1641] who, based on Granger causality tests, ﬁ  nd that “[…] the dependence of performance on 
revenue seems to be greater for smaller clubs than for the larger”.402 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
14.  We explicitly exclude the case, where one team faces all additional demand.
15.  From now on, we will equivalently speak of measuring competitive balance.
16.  We refer to the study by Humphreys [2002] as support for choosing this time horizon.
17.  Under a 3-point system, equation (4) becomes  17 1 . N .
18.  In fact, applying this index in a sports framework is likely to result in a ﬂ  awed measurement of 
competitive balance. Whereas it is possible in an industry framework for a ﬁ  rm to capture the whole 
market, no single team within a league can win all league matches. We are grateful to an anonymous 
referee for bringing this point to our attention.
19.  For an introduction on VAR estimation, see, for example, Hamilton [1994].
20.  As the Herﬁ  ndahl-Index is not our main concern in this study, we do not give the detailed results.
21.  From now on, for reasons of simplicity, we will speak of fan attendance instead of fan attendance ﬁ  rst 
differences.
22.  The included constant merely reﬂ  ects the non-zero mean of the series.
23.  For an introduction to co-integration. See, for example, Greene [2003] and Hamilton [1994].
24. For  ISD and Herﬁ  ndahl, co-integration could be ruled based on our results from Table 2.
25.  Values for the SC are not given in this paper.
26.  Although the Ligue 1 is not as renowned as the Spanish Primera Division, the latter had to be left 
out as the relevant data could not be obtained.
27.  The unit root test results for England, Italy and France are given in the Appendix.
28.  See Table 16 in the Appendix. Note that we do not show the coefﬁ  cients on the error correction term 
throughout this paper.
29.  Recall from section “Empirical Analysis” that a positive sign refers to a negative effect on the degree 
of competitive balance.
30.  The results are given in Table 17 in the Appendix. Except for the Herﬁ  ndahl-Index, no co-integra-
tion could be found on a 5% level of signiﬁ  cance. As a consequence, we speciﬁ  ed a VEC model for the 
Herﬁ  ndahl-Index.
31.  Very recently, there has been another scandal in the Serie A, which resulted in Turin being relegated 
to the Serie B, denial of championship titles and exclusion from international competitions.
32.  Unfortunately, we have not been able to obtain data, such as admission prices or disposable income, 
on these factors for all countries over the sample period. The robustness of our results with respect 
to these factors would be an important task for future research.
33.  The latter two being due to a lack of access to the corresponding data.
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